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ON THE STATUS OF THE CONCEPTS OF MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY
SARAH HOAGLAND
Centennial College
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588

Observer bias is considerable in studies investigating differences
between the characters of the sexes, partly because "masculinity"
and "femininity" are not empirical concepts. Instead, they function to
sort out phenomena by determining a range of significance, thus
encouraging discriminatory evaluation of human action.
To support this I argue:
1.

Particular character traits are assessed (valued and understood) differently depending on whether they apply to
men or women.

2.

Counterexamples to the generalization, "All men are
masculine," are not accepted as real counterexamples,
but are rather regarded as abnormal (subnormal, not rare).

t t t
INTRODUCTION
Many scientific studies address, in one way or another,
the issue of differences between the characters of the sexes;
and the concepts of masculinity and femininity, as the.y are
used in scientific literature, are assumed to be based on findings. As such, the issue is presupposed to be a purely factual
one, and tests are designed to discover what the differences
are, as well as what their source or sources are, in order to
better understand male and female natures. Observer bias in
these sorts of studies is considerable; women entering the
sciences are documenting it.
Naturally, one wonders why observer bias is prevalent.
In fact, it arises because "masculinity" and "femininity"
are not empirical concepts: They do not arise as a result of,
nor are they susceptible to, empirical investigation. Instead,
they are evaluative concepts which function to categorize
and interpret behavioral data.
I

Evidence is being amassed which points to serious observer bias prevalent in tests seeking a biological basis for the
alleged phenomena of masculinity and femininity. In the
first place, as Kaplan and Bean (1976:99ff) point out, scientists exaggerate male-female differences by attempting to
correlate traits thought to be masculine with testosterone, a
male hormone, while failing to look for correlates of the same
traits in female biology. Rarely are attempts made to discover
hormonal correlates of aggression in females. Further, scien-

tists often define aggression by how it is manifested in or
manipulated by males, seek male patterns of aggression in
females, and conclude that females are not aggressive. Rather
than investigate male and female patterns of aggression, which
may differ due to situations available for expressing aggression, scientists report that aggression is a male trait-the very
assumption on which the research was based. In the name of
establishing fact, scientists perpetuate cultural value.
Other aspects of observer bias are indicated when one
compares results of similar hormonal studies conducted at
different times by different scientists. Rosenberg (1973)
surveyed studies of castrated male guinea pigs that had been
injected with estrogen. As published by one group, this resulted in increased mounting activity. According to another,
it resulted in decreased mounting and increased receptive
postures. A third group reported a decrease in any sexual
behavior. Rosenberg (1973:114) notes: "When three different laboratories get three different results on nearly identical
experiments, observer bias, even in guinea pigs, is very likely."
The history of research on sex differences indicates that experimental methods are fraught with cultural bias.
Yet another aspect of observer bias has been brought to
light by Homey (1974). When mapped on a bell curve, the
results of tests designed to indicate the presence of analytic
ability, such as Whitkin's rod and frame test, yield far greater
statistical differences between individuals within one sex
than between the sexes. Nevertheless, differences between the
sexes are deemed significant, purportedly indicating a sex
difference in analytic ability. But the results defy predictability of individual behavior and do not justify differential treatment, thus revealing that the alleged statistical significance is
illusory. (Dr. Horney proposes looking for differences of
character traits within situations, not within biology. In this
way, one need not regard Golda Meir or Indira Ghandi as
abnormal females, but rather as normal heads of state.)
Grave consequences of observer bias become apparent
when male scientists are asked whether political restrictions
on women are biologically justifiable. Hall (1976 :81) notes
that biologists are frequently called upon "to evaluate the
extent and significance of biologically controlled differences
between the sexes." Nineteenth-century scientists provided
"professional" opinions with respect to women's capacity to
reason. One outstanding example of observer bias in the late
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nineteenth century, noted by Klein (1971 :4243), was the
certainty of brain anatomists that the frontal lobe, which was
then believed to be the seat of thought, was more developed
in males than females. (And it was not until scientists no
longer believed the frontal lobe to be the seat of thought that
they admitted the male frontal lobe is not larger than that of
the female.) As Whitbeck (1976) points out, the ''women-areundeveloped-men" view pervades scientific theory.
Scientists "found" femininity to be incompatible with
rationality, and this was used to justify political restrictions
on women. As Korsemeyer (1976) explains, seventeenthcentury liberal philosophers such as Locke justified the rights
of citizenship on the basis of man's ability to reason, an ability
which distinguishes him from (other) animals. Naturally, if
women were not prone to rationality, there were no grounds
on which to bestow the rights of citizenship, i.e., to remove
political restrictions.
II
Observer bias, thus, is a serious problem prevalent in
studies investigating character differences between men and
women. This is not simply due to failings of individual scientists. A conceptual confusion is involved, for the status of
"masculinity" and "femininity" is not empirical. The concepts
do not arise from empirical investigation and discovery, nor
are they really susceptible to disputation.
In the first place, character traits paradigmatic of "masculinity ," such as aggression, are assessed differently depending on whether they apply to men or women. Aggression is
normally considered a flaw in women while regarded as an
asset in men. On the surface, this appears to be insufficient
indication that "masculinity" and "femininity" are not empirical. By analogy, fragility is valued differently when applied
to various forms of glass; it is considered a flaw in windowpanes and an asset in wine glasses. Nevertheless, the basis for
the valuation is empirical. Windowpanes require sturdiness to
be effective weathering agents, while the purposes for which
wine glasses are designed make sturdiness a defect.
However, the analogy does not hold. Windowpanes are
designed and manufactured by people for a certain purpose.
Men and women are not designed or manufactured by people
for a certain purpose. To claim that aggression as valued in
men but not in women is analogous to sturdiness as valued in
windowpanes but not in wine glasses, is to commit a form of
the naturalistic fallacy. The implication is that men and
women, while not designed by people, are designed by nature,
as if the fact that aggression is valued in men but not in
women is justified by (natural) fact, by the natural purposes
for which they were designed and used. However, since people
did not design men and women-if, indeed, it even makes
sense to talk of men and women being designed-any purpose
for which they might be used is determined only from observing what they are capable of. (This is not true of window170

panes.) And as not all things men and women are capable of
are valued (e.g., women are capable of aggression), there is no
basis in (natural) fact for valuing aggression in men but not
women. So, the matter is not analogous to the valuation of
sturdiness in windowpanes but not wine glasses. Hence, that
traits paradigmatic of "masculinity" and "femininity" are
valued differently, depending on whether they apply to males
or females, suggests that such traits do not play a legitimate
role in correlations seeking biological bases of sex differentiation. It also indicates that "masculinity" and "femininity"
are not based on empirical findings.
In the second place, character traits paradigmatic of
"masculinity" and "femininity" are not only assessed differently in that they are valued differently in men and women,
they are also understood differently. (This is not true of
fragility in glass.) An aggressive male is normally seen as confident and ambitious. AggreSSion in a woman is normally viewed
as indicative of frustration and neurosis. As confidence is
rarely equated with frustration, researchers are bound to
"fmd" that male and female natures differ, which is to say
that such fmdings are not the result of empirical discovery but
rather of cultural biases. And this is, at least in part, because
the concepts of masculinity and femininity encourage discriminatory perception and evaluation of human action such
as aggressive behavior. As such, the concepts themselves do
not arise from empirical investigation, nor are they really
susceptible to disconfirmation.
III
Perhaps the easiest way to detect the status of a concept
is to form a generalization and test it by counterexample. If a
concept is empirical in nature, that is, susceptible to research,
the generalization will be susceptible to refutation. For example, the generalization, "All bachelors are unmarried men,"
is unlike the generalization, "All grass is green," in that the
latter is subject to empirical investigation, while the former
is not. Novelist Willa Cather describes the reddish prairie grass
of Nebraska, and one could discover upon investigation that,
in fact, not all grass is green. In this case, a counterexample
proves the generalization false. Further, red prairie grass is no
more and no less a subnormal strain of grass than is green crab
grass or Kentucky bluegrass. All are real grass, even if there are
some differences in chemical composition.
Alternatively, should a novelist attempt to describe
bachelors who are married, this is not the sort of topic about
which investigations might be conducted. The truth of "All
bachelors are unmarried men" stems from the words themselves. Anyone claiming to have a counterexample has simply
not learned what "bachelor" means. Nothing will function as
a counterexample, which is to say that the concept is not·
subject to scientific research. It is not empirical. It is analytic.
Now consider the statements, "All women are feminine" .
or "All men are masculine." When a novelist describes a man~

who is not masculine, the situation is not entirely analogous
to the bachelor example; the temptation' is not actually to
claim that this person does not understand what "men"
means. However, it is equally true that one does not react as
in the grass example. The result has not been a simple discovery, perhaps with surprise, that not all men are masculine.
Instead, the counterexamples are acknowledged, but are not
accepted as "real" men. Somehow these men are abnormal,
"effeminate." Only certain traits are applicable to "real"
men, even though other traits are found in men. This is to say
that the basis for selection lies in cultural value and not in
empirical investigation and discovery.

might explain why a counterexample is regarded as abnormal,
i.e., rare. But in questions about traits paradigmatic of "masculinity" and "femininity," counterexamples are not regarded
as rare; they are treated as exceptions to be discounted because they are abnormal, i.e., substandard. In truly empirical
investigations, just a few of a sort of x do not make those
x's any the less "real" x's. Thus, an appeal to generalities to
salvage "masculinity" and "femininity" as empirical concepts
fails; the evaluative nature of these concepts equally affects
the generality and the generalization.

One might object, by analogy, that a counterexample to
"All cats are four-legged" is also regarded as abnormal; hence,
that counterexamples are not readily accepted does not show
that a given claim is not empirical. Yet, the analogy does not
hold. In the first place, the abnormality arises due to the fact
that the cat was once four-legged and has since lost a leg due
to an accident. Further, a cat having three legs as a result of
an accident is not thereby less of a "real" cat. And should
a three-legged strain of cat develop, one would come to discover that not all cats are four-legged. Three-legged cats would
eventually be viewed as no more an abnormal, i.e., substandard, strain of cat than red grass is viewed as an abnormal
strain of grass, rare, perhaps, depending on numbers, but not
substandard, not any less a real cat.

"Masculinity" and "femininity" are limiting concepts
unlike "greenness" and not entirely unlike "material object."
They function to sort out phenomena by determining a range
of significance, and, in that sense, they limit perception. They
facilitate interpretation of human action-action that is otherwise interpretable-by throwing a certain light on it (as is true
of any prejudgmental concept). Thus, for example, the actions
of a wife who puts raw eggs in her husband's lunch pail will be
viewed as indicative of feminine dizziness (though not professorial absent-mindedness) rather than a conscious or nonconscious aggressive act of sabotage in a situation devoid of
real power for self-determination. The former fits the model
of femininity.

Others might object that there is a significant difference
between generalizations (All men are masculine) and generalities (Most men are masculine), and while a counter example
to the former is regarded as abnormal rather than a "real"
counterexample, it is because in fact the generality is true.
This, however, begs the question.
The distinction between a generalization and a generality is useful only when one is trying to prove a generality false.
One bit of red grass proves that not all grass is green, but it
does not disprove the generality, "Most grass is green." Yet,
this does not salvage the generality from the issue raised here.
When a counterexample is uncovered in science, while it can
potentially prove a theory false, it may, in fact, be used to
prove the theory false, or it may be discounted as an exception. But there are limits to discarding counterexamples, beyond which they become significant. In the case of investigations of differences between men and women relating to the
characters of the se~es, the discarding of counterexamples,
even in "objectively measurable" areas, is carried to extremes.
Thus, scientists were once convinced that female frontal lobes
were slightly smaller than male frontal lobes, discounting as
an exception any female frontal lobe larger than a male frontal lobe. This occurred not only in spite of the fact that the
generalization is false, but also in spite of the fact that the
generality is false.
Further, if an appeal to generality attempts to justify
why a counterexample is regarded as abnormal, at most it

N

Until "masculinity" and "femininity" are disregarded
and discredited and the paradigms lose their preferred status,
there will be no objective investigation relating to the characters of males and females. There is a conceptual confusion
underlying the attempt to conduct studies to discover characteristics peculiar to women, for example, in order to discover the true nature of femininity, when the perception of
these characteristics already depends on a concept of femininity. No wonder there is observer bias. "Masculinity" and
"femininity" do not function as empirical concepts; hence,
studies investigating paradigmatic traits, or phenomena relating
to paradigmatic traits, will only reinforce existing valuations
while appearing to locate fmdings in fact.
-
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